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With Great(er) Power Comes Great(er) Responsibility: 




This article asks how the dialogue surrounding greater municipal autonomy intersects with 
Aboriginal rights and title, recognized under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
(Constitution), with a particular focus on Toronto.1 The first part of this article sets out the 
ways in which Toronto sought empowerment following the Better Local Government Act 
or Bill 5, including judicial consideration of the constitutional role of Canadian 
municipalities, the legislative advances made by provincial governments, and the yet-
implemented possibilities of protection through a little-used mechanism within the 
Constitution. Part II analyzes the obligations of municipalities in respect of Indigenous 
Peoples and communities with or without increased authority. I explain the ways in which 
municipal governments are introducing legal reforms to improve Indigenous-municipal 
relationships, the increasing expectations of municipal consultation with First Nations, and 
the direction of Canadian jurisprudence. In the final part of the article, I argue that any 
municipalities seeking protection or asserting a role as a democratic government within 
the Canadian federal landscape must understand their obligations to Indigenous 
communities.  
 
IN AUGUST 2018, MID-WAY THROUGH THE CITY OF TORONTO’S democratic election, the 
Province of Ontario enacted the Better Local Government Act (Bill 5), legislation that drastically 
reduced the size of City Council.2 The result was a slap in the face to the authority of Canada’s 
largest city, just over a year after Toronto’s City Council had changed the number of electoral 
districts following a multi-year ward boundary review process.3 The City of Toronto succeeded in 
challenging the newly enacted law at the lower court level. However, the decision was overturned 
one year later with a three-two split in favour of the province at the Court of Appeal.4 The lack of 
legal clarity has led to a pressing constitutional conundrum, if not crisis, and the Court of Appeal 
decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), triggering a long overdue legal 
analysis of municipal authority.5 In the meantime, many advocacy groups and politicians have 
 
 Assistant Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. Many thanks to Mariana Valverde and 
two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback, and to the JLSP student and faculty editors for their wise 
suggestions and corrections. All errors and omissions are my own. 
1 This article uses the terms, “Indigenous Peoples” to refer to First Nations, Inuit, Métis, and other Indigenous Peoples; 
“Aboriginal Peoples” when referring to terminology used in the Constitution; “First Nations” to refer to Indigenous 
nations and government systems; and “bands” to described elected Indigenous councils as defined under the Indian 
Act. Where possible, I use the name of the Indigenous community. All errors are my own. 
2 SO 2018, c 11 [Bill 5]. 
3 Toronto City Council, Follow-up Report on the Toronto Ward Boundary Review, City Council Decision EX18.2 
(Toronto: TCC, 8 November 2016). 
4 Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732 [Toronto 1]. 
5 City of Toronto v Attorney General of Ontario, 2019 ONCA 732, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38921 (26 March 
2020) [City of Toronto 2020]; Toronto City Council, Legal Challenge to Bill 5, the Better Local Government Act, City 
Council Decision CC10.3 (Toronto: TCC, 2 October 2019) [Toronto CC10.3] 
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called for greater protection for municipalities through mechanisms such as a city charter.6 Other 
Canadian provinces, perhaps influenced by the undisciplined Ontario example, have used their 
constitutional power to cancel plans for expanded local autonomy.7 
Bill 5 and the subsequent legal story have drawn attention to the precarious legal status of 
Canadian municipalities. However, within this tale, little mention has been made of the effects of 
municipal authority on Indigenous rights. The forgotten narrative of the Indigenous origin of 
Toronto and many other Canadian municipalities ignores the legal protections for Indigenous 
Peoples under Section 35 of the Constitution, Act 1982 (Constitution).8 The Constitution states 
that “Aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed.”9 Many First Nations have treaty and land interests such as reserves, urban reserves, and 
fee simple title at the urban scale, both within and adjacent to municipalities, and about half of all 
Indigenous Peoples live within cities across Canada.10 There are treaty relationships and 
Indigenous claims within and adjacent to cities, but localities often claim uncertainty in regard to 
the obligations they owe to First Nations.11 As municipal authority changes, so too will 
Indigenous-municipal legal relationships, especially if local governments are constitutionally 
protected.12 
This article raises urgent attention to Indigenous-municipal legal relationships across 
Canada, focusing squarely on Toronto, the target of Bill 5. With their important access to resources 
and transportation, most Canadian cities were Indigenous spaces first.13 Toronto sits on land that 
hosts a patchwork quilt of overlapping territories that include the Mississaugas of the New Credit, 
the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, Treaty 13 Nations, the Wendat, the Petun Nations, and other 
Indigenous communities.14 It is subject to the Dish With One Spoon Wampum Belt Covenant, a 
treaty agreement between the Haudenosaunee Confederacy and the Ojibwe and allied Nations to 
peaceably share and care for the resources around the Great Lakes. The displacement of Indigenous 
communities in cities like Toronto is a fundamental and omitted part of the lore of most cities. For 
example, the Mississauga tribe of the New Credit received ten shillings for the 250,880 acres of 
what became the City of Toronto, yet many history books omit any mention of the treaty or the 
sale of the territories, which has become the basis of a land claim.15 Instead, the City places its 
origin story at 1834, not the Treaty of Toronto signed in 1787, briefly revoked in 1794, and 
reasserted in 1805.16 The many Indigenous spaces and claims that span the geography of what we 
 
6 “A Proposal to Empower and Protect Toronto,” Charter City Toronto, online: <chartercitytoronto.ca> 
[perma.cc/TYJ3-CL6Y] [Charter City Toronto].  
7 Justin Giovanneti & Carrie Tait, “Mayors of Calgary, Edmonton criticize funding cuts to cities in Alberta budget,” 
The Globe & Mail (25 October 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com/canada/alberta/article-alberta-premier-jason-
kenneys-budget-cuts-hit-calgary-and-edmonton> [perma.cc/9SZ5-VGT5]. 
8 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution]. 
9 Ibid, s 35(1). 
10 Mary Jane Norris, Stewart Clatworthy & Evelyn Peters, “The Urbanization of Aboriginal Populations in Canada: 
A Half Century in Review” in Evelyn Peters & Christopher Anderson, eds, Indigenous in the City: Contemporary 
Identities and Cultural Innovation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) 29. 
11 See e.g. Heather Dorries, Rejecting the “False Choice”: Foregrounding Indigenous Sovereignty in Planning Theory 
and Practice (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012) [unpublished]. 
12 Felix Hoehn & Michael Stevens, “Local Governments and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 
971. 
13 Victoria Jane Freeman, ‘Toronto Has No History!’ Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism and Historical Memory in 
Canada’s Largest City (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2010) at 4–5 [unpublished]. 
14 See e.g. “Native Land,” Native Land, online: <native-land.ca> [perma.cc/TN8U-HTM7]. 
15 Freeman, supra note 13 at 72–73. 
16 Ibid at 83–85. 
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call Toronto go well beyond the scope of this article, but are critical in considering the city’s quest 
for autonomy.  
This article focuses specifically on the implications of increased municipal protection on 
Indigenous rights and sovereignty. In this analysis, I draw particular attention to the City of 
Toronto, Canada’s largest municipality and the fifth largest government in the country, which is 
currently engaged in efforts to assume greater autonomy.17 The first part of this article explains 
what we mean when we talk about the empowerment of cities. I set out the constitutional role of 
Canadian municipalities, exploring the legal nudges made by the SCC to recognize the democratic 
importance of local governments through the development of principles such as subsidiarity and 
cooperative federalism within the constraints of section 92(8) of the Constitution. The article 
explains how Bill 5 unleashed a series of arguments by applicants, respondents, and intervenors, 
and many advocacy efforts aimed at protecting local democracy related to the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) and unwritten constitutional principles.18 In the second part of 
the article, I outline the effects of a more expansive understanding of municipal authority on 
Indigenous Peoples and communities. I draw on the early promise of reimagined Indigenous-
municipal relationships coupled with increasing local obligations to First Nations to argue that any 
changes to city power must be prefaced with a clear understanding of a city’s responsibilities to 
Indigenous Peoples and communities. I conclude that local governments asserting claims for 
recognition and respect both within and outside the existing constitutional fabric must likewise 
recognize and uphold their own legal obligations to Indigenous Peoples and communities. 
I. WHAT DOES THE EMPOWERMENT OF CITIES MEAN? 
 
The legal story of municipal authority continues to evolve in Canada. In this story, the courts play 
a prominent but not decisive role. There are three ways to talk about city empowerment: through 
the courts, through legislation, and through a constitutional change. 
 
A. THROUGH THE COURTS 
 
Under section 92(8) of the Constitution, municipal status and jurisdiction appear unambiguous: 
“Municipal institutions” are within the province’s exclusive authority and have no protection 
against changes to the design and power imposed on them by provinces.19 This constitutional 
brevity has led municipalities to be called “creatures of the province” with provincial governments 
empowered to set rules regarding what municipalities can and cannot do.20 Based on existing case 
law, any constitutional understanding, review of municipal authority, or assessment of municipal 
decision-making thus means examining the specific acts undertaken by a municipality and whether 
 
17 See e.g. Charter City Toronto, supra note 6. 
18 Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONCA 761 (factums filed at the Ontario Court of Appeal by the 
City of Toronto, the Attorney General of Ontario, the Canadian Constitution Foundation, the Canadian Taxpayers 
Federation, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities). 
19 Stanley Makuch, Neil Craik & Signe B Leisk, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law, 2nd ed (Toronto, ON: 
Thomas Carswell, 2004) at 81. 
20 Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status” 
(2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ at 409. 
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they are acting within their “defined jurisdictional sphere,” with a failure to do so resulting in “the 
courts quashing the municipal action as ultra vires, or beyond its legal competence.”21  
Although cities are left out of the Constitution as a level of government,22 the interpretation 
by the courts of municipal power has evolved considerably over the last twenty years.23 Cases 
concerning municipal authority mostly focus on reviews of municipal decision-making to ask 
whether specific acts undertaken by the municipality are ultra vires or within their “defined 
jurisdictional sphere.”24 In asking whether decisions were within a locality’s powers, the SCC has 
recognized municipalities as representative governments. For example, in Nanaimo (City) v Rascal 
Trucking Ltd in 2000, the Court stated that “municipalities balance complex and divergent 
interests” in decision-making, thus “warrant[ing] that intra vires decisions of municipalities be 
reviewed upon a deferential standard.”25 That same year, the Supreme Court decreed that 
“[m]unicipal governments are democratic institutions through which the people of a community 
embark upon and structure a life together.”26 In R v Guignard, decided just two years later, the 
SCC affirmed that municipal powers “must be given a generous interpretation because their 
closeness to the members of the public who live or work on their territory make them more 
sensitive to the problems experienced by those individuals.”27  
A number of the SCC’s recent decisions also make room for the recognition of 
municipalities as a legitimate level of government in the federal structure. In 2007, the SCC firmly 
decided in Canadian Western Bank v Alberta that the Constitution must be interpreted through the 
lens of “cooperative federalism.”28 Constitutional doctrines are used to balance the overlap of rules 
made by governments, reconcile diversity, and ensure sufficient predictability in the operation of 
powers.29 The principle of cooperative federalism stands strongly against the previous 
interpretation of the federation’s respective jurisdictions as akin to “watertight compartments.”30 It 
also incorporates the doctrine of subsidiarity, which serve as an important component in 
interpreting generously the scope of municipal action.31 Taken together, the pronouncements of 
the SCC regarding the proper interpretation to be given to Canadian federalism is consistent with 
an important role for municipalities as stewards of the local community. 
Despite this seemingly progressive jurisprudence, judges have to date declared that they 
will not re-read the Constitution so as to include municipalities as a protected order of 
government.32 For example, in East York v Ontario (Attorney General), several municipalities 
challenged the Province of Ontario’s decision to create the Toronto megacity in 1998 without the 
 
21 Mukich, Craik & Leisk, supra note 19 at 81. 
22 See e.g. Daniel Weinstock, “Federalism and Cities” in James E Sterling & Jacob T. Levy, eds, Federalism and 
Subsidiarity (New York; New York University Press, 2014) 259 at 259–87. 
23 Morton v British Columbia (Agriculture and Lands), 2009 BCSC 136 at para 107. 
24 Mukich, Craik & Leisk, supra note 19 at 81. 
25 1 SCR 342 at para 35.  
26 Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria (City) 2000 SCC 64 at para 33.  
27 2002 SCC 14 at para 17. 
28 2007 SCC 22 at para 22-24 [Canadian Western Bank]. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See e.g. ibid; Multiple Access Ltd. v McCutcheon, [1982] 2 SCR 161; Law Society of British Columbia v 
Mangat, 2001 SCC 67; OPSEU v Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 SCR 2. 
31 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 287 at paras 42–43, 45 (the SCC held that a broad application of the doctrine 
of interjurisdictional immunity is incompatible with flexible federalism, which aligns more closely with the 
constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect, and paramountcy, and the principle of subsidiarity). 
32 Canada Post Corporation v Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767 at para 85. 
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consent of the amalgamated six municipalities.33 The Superior Court of Ontario concluded that the 
unilateral action did not exceed the province's constitutional authority to make laws relating to 
municipal institutions in the province. The Court set out four “clear” principles regarding the 
constitutional status of Canadian cities:34 (i) municipal institutions lack constitutional status; (ii) 
municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial legislation so 
provides; (iii) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are subject 
to abolition or repeal by provincial legislation; and (iv) municipal institutions may exercise only 
those powers which are conferred upon them by statute. This decision was upheld by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal.35 Likewise, Justice Louis LeBel in 114957 Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Société 
d’arrosage v Hudson (Town) in 2001, cautioned thatcourts must assume municipal authority where 
none exists.36 This means that the courts have not read section 92(8) or any other section of the 
Constitution as displacing provincial governments’ authority over municipalities or protecting 
municipalities from provincial interference. 
It is squarely within this legal terrain that Bill 5 was enacted. Toronto’s nomination period 
for the statutorily scheduled municipal election began on 1 May 2018.37 Thousands of candidates 
signed up in the first two months of the race, with a record number of candidates from historically 
marginalized communities vying for councillor positions.38 On 7 June 2018, the Conservative 
party won a majority of seats in the provincial legislature and Doug Ford, a previous Toronto 
councillor, became the premier. Bill 5 passed into law on 14 August 2018 and, as promised, 
amended the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (City of Toronto Act) by reducing the size of city council 
from forty-seven to twenty-five.39 Several candidates for City Council, mainly women and people 
from other historically marginalized communities, challenged Bill 5, as did the City of Toronto 
once empowered to do so by City Council, following a tepid response by the city’s mayor.40  
On 10 September 2018, Superior Court Justice Edward Belobaba found that Bill 5 
“substantially interfered with both the candidates’ and the voters’ right to freedom of expression 
as guaranteed under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” on two 
grounds and could not be saved under section 1.41 First, the change in the number of wards mid-
way through the campaign period breached candidates’ freedom of expression.42 Second, using 
section 3 to inform the interpretation of section 2(b), the large cut in the size of City Council and 
increase in the size of wards violated voters’ freedom of expression rights by making them unable 
to “cast a vote that can result in effective representation.”43 In a whirlwind decision, following the 
government’s threat that they would invoke the notwithstanding clause to override Justice 
 
33 (1997), 34 OR (3d) 789 (ONSC) Borins J, aff’d by ONCA, (1997) 36 OR (3d) 733, leave to appeal to SCC refused 
(1998) 1 SCR vii. 
34 Ibid at 797–98.  
35Ibid. 
36 SCC 40 at 49 [Spraytech]. 
37 Municipal Elections Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 32, s 33(4) [Municipal Elections Act]. 
38 City of Toronto et al v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 5151 at para 31 [City of Toronto et al]. 
39 SO 2006, c 11, Sched A, s 128(1). 
40 City of Toronto et al, supra note 39; Alexandra Flynn, “The legal case against Ford’s assault on local democracy,” 
Spacing Magazine (30 July 2018), online: <spacing.ca/toronto/2018/07/30/the-legal-case-against-fords-assault-on-
local-democracy>[perma.cc/DQ4Y-84PM] 
41 City of Toronto et al, supra note 38 at para 10. 
42 Ibid at para 31. 
43 Ibid at para 51. Section 3 of the Charter guarantees Canadian citizens the democratic right to vote in a general, 
federal, or provincial election, and the right to be eligible for membership in the House of Commons or of a provincial 
legislative assembly, subject to the requirements of Section 1 of the Charter. 
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Belobaba’s decision, the Court of Appeal granted the Province of Ontario’s request for a stay, with 
the result that the election moved forward under a twenty-five ward model.44  
Exactly one year later, the Court of Appeal decided in a three-two decision to overturn 
Justice Belobaba’s decision on the grounds that the province was constitutionally empowered to 
design municipality authority in whatever manner it wished. The majority declared Bill 5 to be 
constitutional, with no violations of section 2(b) of the Charter or of unwritten constitutional 
principles. They stated that the affair was a “political matter,” and that the Court had “no legitimate 
basis” to intervene.45 The majority emphatically rejected combining Charter sections by using 
section 3 to inform section 2(b), stating that each Charter right must be unambiguous and “the 
content of one right cannot be subsumed by another, or used to inflate its content.”46 They also 
took offense to the use of unwritten constitutional or democratic principles to overturn Bill 5, 
stating that even if the Act did violate either such principle, “there would be no legitimate basis 
for the court to invalidate” the law.47 The two dissenting judges resolutely disagreed, concluding 
that,  
 
[T]he actions taken by Ontario to secure that result left a trail of devastation of basic 
democratic principles in its wake. By extinguishing almost half of the city’s existing 
wards midway through an active election, Ontario blew up the efforts, aspirations and 
campaign materials of hundreds of aspiring candidates, and the reciprocal engagement 
of many informed voters. This infringement of s. 2(b) was extensive, profound, and 
seemingly without precedent in Canadian history.48  
 
The dissent rested its exposition on section 2(b), not unwritten constitutional principles, as the 
basis upon which Bill 5 should be invalidated. 
The Court of Appeal’s decision has been appealed to the SCC, with numerous grounds of 
appeal possible outside of section 2(b) of the Charter, including unwritten constitutional principles 
and the applicability of section 3 of the Charter to municipalities.49 While the SCC could consider 
how the notion of municipalities as “creatures of the province” nests with the increasing amount 
of deference granted to local governments as democratic bodies, it is more likely that the Court 
will focus on the degree to which provinces are constrained from interfering with local elections 
or undermining candidates’ and voters’ expectations of freedom of expression during the voting 
period. However, even if the Court focuses on Bill 5’s introduction during an election and the 
resulting impact on the expression rights of candidates and voters, the SCC is clear that 
municipalities are government actors within the Canadian federation. While they may have their 
powers limited by provinces, they are considered by courts to be public bodies that serve a 
democratic function.50 Overturning Bill 5 on any grounds would only solidify this jurisprudence. 
 
44 Toronto 1, supra note 4. 
45 Ibid at para 6. 
46 Ibid at para 76. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid at para 136. 
49 Toronto CC10.3 and City of Toronto 2020, supra note 5. For a comprehensive discussion of the potential arguments 
on appeal to the SCC see the Introduction to this special volume. 
50 See e.g. Pacific National Investment Ltd v Victoria (City), 2000 SCC 64 at para 33 (“Municipal governments are 
democratic institutions through which the people of a community embark upon and structure a life together. Even in 
this context, however, nobody can challenge the proposition that municipal governments are creatures of the 
legislature – a municipal government has only those powers granted to it by provincial legislation”). 
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B. THROUGH PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 
 
Bill 5 was introduced through provincial legislation. The main question that arose in the legal case 
that challenged Bill 5 was whether the legislation was valid as a result of its introduction mid-way 
through an election. Only one intervenor challenged the legislation on the basis that section 92(8) 
should be read as prohibiting the provincial government from enacting Bill 5, noting among other 
arguments that, “[l]ocal democracy is older than Canada.”  
Immediately after the Norman Conquest, William I granted a Charter to the City of London, 
and the City won the right to choose its own Mayor on 9 May 1215. A month later, the Magna 
Carta confirmed these rights and granted “that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall 
enjoy all their liberties and free customs.” 51 The argument of the intervenor concludes that the 
“positive language of 92(8) confirms the place of the municipal council.”52 This argument had 
little traction in the Court of Appeal’s majority decision and dissent, consistently with previous 
decisions.53 While protection for municipal elections under section 2(b) or section 3 of the Charter 
could limit an expansive understanding of provincial power in respect of municipalities and 
therefore continue to incrementally advance the recognition of municipal government in Canada’s 
federal model, such a decision would not displace the current interpretation of section 92(8) of the 
Constitution. 
As such, Canada’s largest cities have sought greater autonomy through provincial 
legislation itself as a way to overcome provincial involvement in local affairs. Over the last two 
decades, and following extensive lobbying efforts, provinces across the country have given more 
expansive powers to large municipalities—including more options for raising revenue and greater 
oversight in matters such as infrastructure and housing.54 For example, in 2016, the province of 
Québec introduced legislation that gave greater autonomy to Québec and Montréal, the latter also 
being granted special official status as a metropolis.55 Among other new fiscal and regulatory 
powers, Montréal gained new authority in housing, heritage preservation, and homelessness and 
immigration policy.56  
The City of Toronto Act was meant to confer governmental status to Toronto via provincial 
legislation. Section 1 of the Act reads: “The City of Toronto exists for the purpose of providing 
good government with respect to matters within its jurisdiction, and the city council is a 
democratically elected government which is responsible and accountable.”57 As a government, it 
has the power to “determine what is in the public interest for the City” and to “respond to the needs 
 
51 Toronto 1, supra note 4; Stéphane Émard-Chabot, Mary Eberts & William B Henderson, “Factum of the Intervener, 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities in Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732,” 
(day/month/year of access) at 3, online: 
 <http://www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/C65861/files/C65861.FOI.FederationofCanadianMunicipalities.pdf> 
[perma.cc/T7KY-XNC3] (intervener factum).  
52 Ibid at 4. 
53 East York, supra note 33. 
54 See e.g. Municipal Affairs Act, RSO 1990, c M46; Charter of Ville de Montréal, Métropole du Québec, CQLR c C-
11.4. 
55 Raquel Fletcher, “Quebec signs new partnership with municipalities,” Global News (6 December 2016), online: 
<globalnews.ca/news/3110591/quebec-signs-new-partnership-with-municipalities/> [perma.cc/4XT6-SEBL]. 
56 Staff writer, “Quebec proposes greater autonomy, grants metropolis status for Montreal,” CBC News (8 December 
2016), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-proposes-greater-autonomy-grants-metropolis-status-for-
montreal-1.3888329> [perma.cc/F83M-SQDJ]. 
57 City of Toronto Act, supra note 39, s 1(1). 
117
Flynn: With Great(er) Power Comes Great(er) Responsibility




of the City,” as well as a host of other seemingly expansive powers.58 While initially lauded as 
evidence of a government-to-government relationship, the City of Toronto Act did not explicitly 
prevent the province from overriding Toronto’s final decision on its wards, nor from disrupting a 
democratic election.59 Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General) cited the enactment or specific section of 
the City of Toronto Act as a reason for overturning Bill 5.60  
Moreover, the powers of Canadian municipalities can still be restricted, even in a 
seemingly expansive act—for example, the province retained its power to override Toronto’s 
decisions—or may be limited by other pieces of provincial legislation.61 Even before Bill 5, 
numerous other pieces of legislation already limited the breadth of section 1 of the City of Toronto 
Act and the decision-making powers of local governments in Ontario, including the Planning Act,62 
the Ontario Municipal Board Act,63 the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act,64 the Municipal 
Elections Act, 1996,65 and the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act66 
to name a few.  
At the end of the day, one needs to look at the full suite of legislation to which 
municipalities are subject to understand what they can and cannot do. While provincial 
governments could arguably constrain their own power by requiring a two-thirds vote or municipal 
agreement to make particular decisions, they remain the level of government in charge of decision-
making when it comes to municipal authority. This is evidenced in Alberta, where the province 
introduced a charter for Calgary and Edmonton, its largest cities, in 2018 after years of 
negotiation.67 Calgary’s new city charter contained forty-four new authorities, a new fiscal 
framework with cost-sharing and enhanced revenue tools, more requirements for community input, 
and a more mature government-to-government relationship between the city and the province.68 
After the election of a new provincial government in 2019, these powers were threatened.69 Thus, 
even if an Act pertaining to municipal powers is called a “charter” it does not, on its own, acquire 
a special status that protects it from interference by subsequent provincial governments. It also 
means that provincial governments can delegate responsibilities to municipalities, such as the 
procedural duty to consult Indigenous Peoples before making decisions affecting their 
constitutional rights, as will be discussed later in this article. 
 
C. THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
 
 
58 Ibid, ss 2(1), (2). 
59 Levi & Valverde, supra note 20 at 421. 
60 2019 ONCA 732. 
61 Levi & Valverde, supra note 20 at 454–55. 
62 RSO 1990, c P13. 
63 RSO 1990, c O28.  
64 RSO 1990, c M50. 
65 Municipal Elections Act, supra note 37. 
66 RSO 1990, c M56. 
67 Scott Dippel, “Calgary finally has its city charter,” CBC News (6 April 2018), online: 
<cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/city-council-charter-1.4609322> [perma.cc/L82W-3RJX]. 
68 Alta Reg 40/2018, online: <www.calgary.ca/cs/city-charter/the-city-charter.html?redirect=/citycharter>. 
69 Giovanneti & Tait, supra note 7. 
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A third way of entrenching city power would be by constitutional amendment, for example one 
recognizing city charters in the Constitution. This approach would operationalize section 43 of the 
Constitution which reads: 
 
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies 
to one or more, but not all, provinces, including  
(a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces, and 
(b) any amendment to any provision that relates to the use of English or the 
French language within a province,  
may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of 
Canada only where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons 
and of the legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment applies.70 
 
Canada’s formula for amending the Constitution is very restrictive, requiring the consent of 
the federal government and the legislatures of seven provinces representing fifty per cent of 
Canada’s population.71 However, a single-province amendment only requires the consent of that 
province’s legislature and of the House of Commons pursuant to section 43. Such amendments 
have only been made a handful of times since the adoption of section 43 in 1982. In 1997, 
Newfoundland established a secular school system and Quebec established a language-based 
school system. In 1993, New Brunswick added section 16.1 to the Charter, which guarantees equality 
rights to the province’s English and French-speaking communities.72 
Scholars suggest a great deal of potential for section 43 in providing constitutional 
protection to account for local diversity.73 Toronto’s size relative to other Canadian municipalities 
arguably provides a basis for a different constitutional status. For example, the United States has 
a handful of “home rule” cities; London has special status as the Greater London Authority; and 
Mexico City has its own constitution and power akin to a state.74 As Kathy Brock notes,  
 
The internal logic of section 43 provides guidance in that it recognizes two essential 
facts about the Canadian constitution and the Canadian confederation compact. First, 
it acknowledges a commitment to local autonomy over local affairs …; [t]he second 
principle recognized by section 43 is that the needs and aspirations of all the provinces 




70 Constitution, supra note 8, s 43. 
71 Ibid, s 38. 
72 Dwight Newman, “The Bilateral Amending Formula as a Mechanism for the Entrenchment of Property Rights” 
(2013) 21:2 Const Forum 17 at 18. 
73 See e.g. ibid at 18; Benoît Pelletier, “Les Modalités de la Modification de la Constitution du Canada” (1999) 33:1 
RJT 1 online: <ssl.editionsthemis.com/uploaded/revue/article/rjtvol33num1/pelletier.pdf> [perma.cc/A99X-AQWU]; 
Kathy Brock, “Diversity Within Unity: Constitutional Amendments Under Section 43” (1997) 20:1 Canadian 
Parliamentary Review 23 at 24, online: <revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?param=62&art=49> [perma.cc/G8S2-ET8G]. 
74 Valverde & Levi, supra note 20; Harriet Bulkeley et al, “Enhancing Urban Autonomy: Towards a New Political 
Project for Cities” (2018) 55:4 Urban Studies 702; Alejandra Reyes, “The Evolution of Local Governance in Mexico 
City: Pursuing Autonomy in a Growing Region” IMFG Perspectives Paper (2019), online: 
<munkschool.utoronto.ca/imfg/research/doc/?doc_id=514> [perma.cc/6WU9-UJ7T]. 
75 Brock, supra note 73. 
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Several prominent political actors at the local, provincial, and federal levels have already 
expressed support for the idea of a constitutionally protected City of Toronto. In 2018, former 
Mayor John Sewell and journalist Doug Earl began a campaign to introduce a constitutionally 
protected charter in Toronto.76 They argued that,  
 
A more equitable relationship, with clearly separated authority, exclusive jurisdictions 
for the city, and clear rules on shared jurisdiction, will reduce inter-governmental 
friction, streamline decision-making, eliminate duplication, produce tax savings and 
clear the decks for partnership and cooperation between Toronto and Ontario on 
matters that are truly of mutual interest.77  
 
The charter would be enshrined in the Constitution and would require both federal and provincial 
amendment going forward.78 The proposal has been endorsed by a candidate running for a 
leadership position with the provincial Liberal party, a city councillor, local media, and a Toronto-
area Minister of Parliament.79 Thousands of people have expressed support by attending rallies.80 
While the initiative faces hefty political hurdles, if successful, a city charter would remove the 
unilateral power of the province to determine the City of Toronto’s authority, and would elevate 
the City as a constitutionally protected government.  
As cities seek and gain autonomy and power through any of these three means, there are 
possibilities of greater protection from provincial interference and more decision-making 
autonomy. The initiatives taken over the last two decades, whether through the courts, provinces, 
or campaigns for constitutional protection under section 43, demonstrate a steady upward 
trajectory in recognizing a distinct legal order for cities. This upward trajectory, I argue, carries 
implications and obligations in respect of Indigenous Peoples and communities, as the next section 
explains. 
II. MUNICIPAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND COMMUNITIES 
 
As Bill 5 weaves its way through the courts and as advocates clamor for enhanced city power, 
there is little discussion of the implications for Indigenous Peoples and communities. Local 
governments ought not neglect these implications for two main reasons: first, demands for 
municipal empowerment, whether through courts, legislation, or the Constitution, only magnify 
the existing legal obligations that local governments have to First Nations; second, the omission 
undermines recent local efforts to reimagine municipal-Indigenous relationships.  
 
 
76 “Charter City Toronto In the Media,” Charter City Toronto, online: <chartercitytoronto.ca/in-the-media.html> 
[perma.cc/6QSZ-W9F5] (link to CCTO on Spacing Radio for discussion between John Sewell and Doug Earl about 
Charter Cities). 
77 Ibid. 
78 “Proposal Overview,” Charter City Toronto, online: <chartercitytoronto.ca/proposal-overview.html> 
[perma.cc/R4ZR-MRUY]. 
79 Charter City Toronto, supra note 6. 









A. INCREASING MUNICIPAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST NATIONS 
 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations are recognized and affirmed under section 35(1) of 
the Constitution and have been given additional meaning through the courts with the duty to 
consult and accommodate.81 Although the Constitution recognizes and affirms Aboriginal rights, 
barriers to meaningfully exercising those rights is an urgent issue.82 Courts have been a crucial 
venue for asserting and advancing Indigenous rights, including by specifying how governments 
must engage with First Nations.83  
Despite Canada’s nation-to-nation relationship with IndigenousPpeoples—as evidenced by 
the very fact that it concluded treaties with them—Canadian history is replete with examples of 
what then-Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin of the SCC would eventually call the national 
government’s “cultural genocide” towards Indigenous Peoples through the creation of reserves 
and residential schools, as well as the erosion of hunting and other rights.84 The Dominion, then 
the federal government, has a long history of systematic erosion of Indigenous rights through the 
inability of Indigenous peoples to bring lawsuits concerning their rights, and the loss of status of 
Indigenous women who married non-Indigenous men, to name just a few examples.85 Moreover, 
both the federal and provincial governments have often refused to engage in discussions with 
Indigenous communities over treaty violations and Indigenous claims, such that legal actions have 
been required to bring them to the negotiating table.86 Until recently, Canada was even among a 
small handful of states that refused to bind themselves to the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which, among other things, advances Indigenous rights 
to the protection of their ancestral territories and mandates informed consent from Indigenous 
communities for developments on their lands.87 
One concrete way that Indigenous rights are undermined is through imposed jurisdictional 
knotting. John Borrows writes that jurisdictional fracturing is rampant, meaning that federal and 
provincial governments impose and apply laws that muddy their respective obligations to First 
Nations.88 Scholar Kaitlin Ritchie cautions that the expectation of municipal negotiations with 
First Nations may further water down the nation-to-nation relationship that exists between the 
federal government and First Nations, further compromising treaty and other relationships.89 The 
 
81 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 [Haida]. 
82 Fraser McLeod et al, “Finding Common Ground: A Critical Review of Land Use and Resource Management Policies 
in Ontario, Canada and their Intersection with First Nations” (2015) 6:1  International Indigenous Policy Journal 3; 
Clara M Fraser & Leela Viswanathan, “The Crown Duty to Consult and Ontario Municipal-First Nations Relations: 
Lessons Learned from the Red Hill Valley Parkway Project” (2013) 22:1 Canadian Journal of Urban Research 1. 
83 Haida, supra note 81 at paras 16, 19-20, 47 (referencing R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41; R v Marshall, 
[1999] 3 SCR 456). 
84 Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, “Cultural Genocide of Canada’s Aboriginal People,” (13 July 2015), Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, online: <cigionline.org/articles/cultural-genocide-canadas-aboriginal-people> 
[perma.cc/8KCX-CSL9]. 
85 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, What We Have Learned: Principles of Truth and Reconciliation 
(Winnipeg: TRCC, 2015) at 25. 
86 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010.  
87 GA A/Res/61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 53, UN Doc A/61/53 (2007); see e.g. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples Act, SBC 2019, c 44. 
88 John Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution” in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: 
Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 17. 
89 Kaitlin Ritchie, “Issues Associated with the Implementation of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal 
Peoples: Threatening the Goals of Reconciliation and Meaningful Consultation.” (2013) 46:2 UBC L Rev 397 at 397–
438.  
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conundrum that Ritchie describes plays out in deliberations as to whether municipalities in Ontario 
have a duty to consult and accommodate. This duty arises when the Crown has knowledge (real or 
constructive) of the existence of an Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might 
adversely affect it.90 The Crown is understood by the courts to be the federal and/or provincial 
governments.91 It holds a non-delegable legal duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous 
Peoples in such cases, although it may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to third parties.92  
The courts have stated that the goal of the duty to consult and accommodate is to achieve 
“reconciliation.”93 However, the term has not been given any specific legal meaning.94 To many 
Indigenous Peoples, the vagueness of the aspiration it represents fails to acknowledge the 
colonialism that underpins our legal system. Mariana Valverde and Adriel Weaver write that 
reconciliation involves a “reconciliation of Canadian (Crown) sovereignty with some collective 
rights for [A]boriginal peoples, rights which are sometimes substantive … and sometimes merely 
procedural.”95 They state that reconciliation is “purged of its potential to challenge colonial 
violence” and is instead “a statement whose logical corollary, apparently, is that the Crown must 
act decently not because of international human rights norms but because of its internal, self-
imposed honour.”96 As such, the judicial understanding of reconciliation is measured by the Crown 
itself rather than in accordance with specific principles, such as those contained in UNDRIP, 
making it limited. 
The issues of jurisdictional muddling and of what it concretely means to move towards 
reconciliation become pronounced in considering the relationships between Indigenous local 
communities and settler municipal governments. There are no SCC cases extending the duty to 
consult to municipalities.97 The leading appeal court decision, Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon 
Arm (City), states that municipalities have no independent constitutional duty to consult First 
Nations whose treaty and other interests may be affected by municipal decision-making.98 In this 
case, the Neskonlith were unsuccessful in challenging a decision made by the City of Salmon Arm, 
which allowed a permit for development to be issued in a flood plain area located right beside their 
reserve. Even though the City of Salmon Arm took steps to consult and accommodate the 
Neskonlith, the Court held that the municipality did not owe them a duty to consult, partly on the 
basis that municipalities do not have the capacity to properly do so.99 A handful of other lower 
court decisions have come to the same conclusion.100 
 
90 Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [1997] 4 CNLR 45 at 71. 
91 When beneficial ownership was transferred to Ontario, Ontario took the place of Canada as the level of government 
with the capacity to take up lands, subject to the rights guaranteed by the treaty; see also Keewatin v Ontario (Natural 
Resources), 2013 ONCA 158. 
92 Haida Nation, supra note 81. See also Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geoservices Inc, 2017 SCC 40 [Clyde 
River]; Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 [Chippewas]. 
93 Chippewas, ibid. 
94 R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507. 
95 Mariana Valverde & Adriel Weaver, “‘The Crown Wears Many Hats’: The Black-boxing of Sovereignty in 
Canadian Aboriginal Law” in Kyle McGee, ed, Latour and the Passage of Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2015) 93 at 108. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Shin Imai & Ashley Stacey, “Municipalities and the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: A Case Comment on 
Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm (City),” online (2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 293 at 293–312.  
98 2012 BCCA 379; Ibid.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Also see Morgan v Sun Peaks Resort Corporation, 2013 BCSC 1668; Squamish Nation v British Columbia 
(Community, Sport and Cultural Development), 2014 BCSC 991; Cardinal v Windmill Green Fund LPV, 2016 ONSC 
3456. 
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In 2017, however, two decisions of the SCC increased the likelihood that the duty to consult 
would be extended to municipalities. First, in Clyde River, the SCC decided that the procedural 
aspects of the duty could be delegated to third parties.101 It held that the Crown may rely on 
administrative bodies (in this case, the National Energy Board) to satisfy the duty to consult.102 
The Court added that the Crown must supplement consultation processes where necessary to 
ensure that the duty to consult is adequately discharged.103 An administrative agency may also 
assess the adequacy of its consultation process unless their authority to do so is explicitly removed 
by statute.104 In such cases, the agency is understood as representing the Crown in regard to 
consultation. Felix Hoehn and Michael Stevens advance that—based on Clyde River, on the 
evolution of municipal autonomy, and on the fact that third parties have been put into positions 
where they are in effect, an arm of the Crown—municipalities should be deemed to hold a duty to 
consult and accommodate.105 In any case, across the country, municipalities are expected to 
consult, at least procedurally, on matters that affect First Nations. Municipalities already represent 
the provincial Crown in municipal planning processes, for example, and provinces effectively rely 
on municipalities to discharge this duty.106  
Empowered local governments beg the question of a municipal duty to consult and 
accommodate specifically, and other obligations more broadly, that cities owe to Indigenous 
Peoples and communities.107 Municipalities have a curious place as administrative bodies and sort-
of governments under Canadian law based on their empowerment under section 92(8) of the 
Constitution.108 In Godbout c Longueuil (Ville), questioning whether the Charter applies to 
municipalities, Justice Gérard La Forest (with McLachlin CJ and Justice Claire l’Heureux-Dubé 
concurring) stated in a concurrent opinion that municipalities can only be described as 
“governmental” entities in that, like Parliament and provincial legislatures,  
 
[m]unipical councils are democratically elected by members of the general public and 
accountable to their constituents … possess a general taxing power … [and] are 
empowered to make laws, to administer them and to enforce them within a defined 
territorial jurisdiction. Finally, and most significantly, they derive their existence and 
authority from the provinces. Since the Charter clearly applies to provincial 
legislatures and governments, it must apply to entities upon which they confer 
governmental powers. Otherwise, provinces could simply avoid the application of 
the Charter by devolving powers on municipal bodies. The Charter therefore applies 
to municipalities.109  
 
 
101 Clyde River, supra note 92. 
102 Ibid..  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Hoehn & Stevens, supra note 12. 
106 Ibid; Imai & Stacey, supra note 97. 
107 One question triggered by local demands for municipal empowerment is whether a city that is protected by section 
43 of the Constitution would be considered a Crown, or whether some or all of the city’s powers would still be bound 
by the province because of section 92(8) of the Constitution. Presumably, a charter city would have the same 
obligations as federal and provincial governments.  
108 Spraytech, supra note 36. 
109 [1997] 3 SCR 844 at paras 50–51 [Godbout]. 
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As administrative bodies, municipal governments are tasked with delivering public services.110 
Local governments are reviewable based on administrative law principles like any other public 
body, meaning that a court can assess whether the entity’s decisions meet fairness standards, and 
whether it exceeded its powers. The law determining whether an entity is a public body reviewable 
by the courts was summarized in McDonald v Anishinabek Police Service.111 The Ontario Superior 
Court held that a court can review an entity’s decision “if the body in question is exercising public 
law functions, or if the exercise of its functions have public law consequences.”112 The Court also 
cited Masters v Ontario, stating that if a body fulfills a governmental function, “then the body is 
part of the machinery of government and is subject to public law.”113 The Charter applies to all 
aspects of government, including the legislative, executive, and administrative branches, as well 
as municipalities and municipal by-laws.114  
In short, since local governments exercise public powers delegated by the province, they 
are governmental bodies. Whether or not they are considered part of the Crown in particular 
instances, municipalities can and should take their obligations to Indigenous Peoples and 
communities seriously. In seeking greater legal and constitutional protection—as it currently does 
through its challenge of Bill 5—Toronto should identify how disentangling itself from provincial 
oversight would fit alongside section 35 protections, especially given its own stated commitments 
to UNDRIP and reconciliation. In favour of increased authority through legal action or 
constitutional reform, a city must address its legal obligations to Indigenous Peoples and 
communities, described next. 
 
B. CHANGING GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AT THE LOCAL SCALE 
 
Indigenous and municipal governments across Canada have been reimagining their relationships 
for years, even without a court-recognized duty to consult. Angela D’Elia Decembrini and Shin 
Imai pragmatically voice that First Nations and municipalities have a long-standing history of 
entering into agreements and generating legislative requirements for municipalities to consult and 
accommodate.115 In cities across Canada, there are examples of urban Indigenous agency 
cooperation and coordination established to provide better service delivery. In some cities, 
Indigenous-led organizations have statutory mandates in areas such as child welfare and 
education.116  
On 21 August 2018 Ontario Regional Chief Rose Anne Archibald told municipal leaders 
that, “[a]cross Canada, municipal governments and neighbouring First Nations are developing 
stronger relationships.”117 These relationships, aimed at “long-term prosperity and peace” are built 
 
110 S M Makuch, “Bora Laskin and Municipal and Planning Law” (1985) 35:4 UTLJ 469. 
111 (2006), 83 OR (3d) 132 (ON SCDC) [McDonald]. 
112 Ibid at para 71. 
113 Ibid at para 73; also see Masters v Ontario, (1993) 16 OR (3d) 439 (Ont Ct J). 
114 Godbout, supra note 109. 
115 Angela D’Elia Decembrini & Shin Imai, “Supreme Court of Canada Cases Strengthen Argument for Municipal 
Obligation to Discharge Duty to Consult: Time to Put Neskonlith to Rest” (2019) 56:3 Alta L Rev 935. 
116 Yale D Belanger, “Breaching Reserve Boundaries: Canada v Misquadis and the Legal Creation of the Urban 
Aboriginal Community” in Evelyn Peters & Christopher Anderson, eds, Indigenous in the City: Contemporary 
Identities and Cultural Innovation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) 69.  
117 RoseAnne Archibald, Address (Delivered at the AMO Conference, Ottawa, 21 August 2018), online: Chiefs of 
Ontario <chiefs-of-ontario.org/news_item/orc-roseanne-archibald-speaking-points-at-amo-conference-in-ottawa/> 
[perma.cc/7LTL-BSM5] [unpublished].   
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through “lasting friendships, relationships and partnerships on the principles of truth and 
reconciliation.”118 She stated, “[m]unicipalities, although not original partners to the treaties, are 
considered from a First Nations perspective, to be current and valuable partners and certainly 
benefactors of the Treaty process.”119  
While far from perfect, Toronto has introduced a number of initiatives focused on 
relationship-building. For example, over the last ten years, the City of Toronto has increasingly 
included Indigenous perspectives in its governance model and started to build relationships with 
Indigenous communities.120 There is a broad and diverse range of Indigenous Peoples in Toronto, 
many of whom may not have connections to First Nations on whose territories the city was 
established and continues to develop. This calls for a different approach from the reserve-based 
models most often associated with First Nations governments. The 1996 Report of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) proposed two possible models of urban Indigenous 
governance: greater local political participation through Indigenous representation on political 
bodies at the municipal level, and co-managing urban programs and services.121 RCAP also 
proposed a “community of interest” model through the establishment of a city-wide politically 
representative body. Indigenous communities in Toronto are moving towards both approaches, 
according to the report of the Toronto Aboriginal Research Project.122 Indigenous community 
agencies are participating formally in local government through their representation on the City’s 
Indigenous Affairs Committee, which is presently working towards the development of a larger 
urban Indigenous framework.  
In 2010, the City affirmed recognition and respect for the unique status and cultural 
diversity of Indigenous communities in Toronto, including recognition of their inherent rights 
under the Constitution.123 In 2014, Toronto’s City Council endorsed the 94 Calls to Action from 
the TRC Report and requested the development of concrete actions by staff to fully implement the 
calls to action explicitly relating to the role of municipal governments.124 These measures included 
the adoption of cultural competency training for the Toronto civil service, a ten-year capital project 
to incorporate Indigenous place-making in Toronto parks, and a roadmap and report card regarding 




120 Toronto City Council, Development of an Urban Aboriginal Strategy for Toronto, City Council Decision EX33.5  
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124 See e.g. Peter Wallace, “Fulfilling Calls to Action from Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report” Toronto 
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adopted an ongoing ceremony at its meetings and approved a public campaign to educate residents 
on the Year of Truth and Reconciliation Proclamation.125 
The City of Toronto made important strides by adopting UNDRIP in 2013.126 UNDRIP is 
widely seen by Indigenous activists, scholars, and lawyers as a best practice in considering 
Indigenous-settler relationships.127 Toronto’s UNDRIP-related actions are noteworthy for two 
reasons. First, UNDRIP’s recognition of Indigenous rights goes well beyond the threshold 
established in Canadian law regarding the duty to consult. The standard it sets concerning free, 
prior, and informed consent (FPIC) entails not merely an Indigenous right to be consulted with 
regard to project proposals, but the right to effectively veto projects that cannot be reconciled with 
Indigenous values or interests. While the City of Toronto has not specifically set out how and when 
FPIC applies to project assessments, the adoption of UNDRIP still signals the City’s desire to build 
respectful and reciprocal relationships with Indigenous communities. Second, following the 
release of the TRC report, the City of Toronto acknowledged Article 11 of UNDRIP.128 
Importantly, the City noted “staff’s legal duty to consult,” particularly in relation to environmental 
assessments and heritage.129 The City has taken an important step by imposing this obligation on 
itself.  
Toronto, like a number of other municipalities in Ontario and elsewhere, has created an 
Indigenous Affairs Office meant to oversee place-based relationship building with Indigenous 
communities.130 The Indigenous Affairs Office will help guide the municipal government in its  
relationships with Indigenous Peoples, including urban Indigenous communities, neighbouring 
First Nations and Métis Nations in Ontario, and Indigenous organizations.131 This starts to build a 
corporate knowledge and awareness of the important relationships that are to be cared for by the 
City. As the city deepens its self-awareness, it will begin to polish the links of its relationships 
with Indigenous Peoples and will be able to work better with Indigenous Peoples, organizations, 
and nations in order to implement the principles of UNDRIP and FPIC.  
The early promise of reimagined Indigenous-municipal relationships coupled with 
developments in jurisprudence mean that any changes to city power must be prefaced with a clear 
understanding of the effects on Indigenous Peoples and communities. Campaigns for greater legal 
protection for local governments must recognize Aboriginal and treaty rights. Cities must 
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acknowledge how their quests for greater power nests with their responsibilities to First Nations 
and Indigenous Peoples.  
III. CONCLUSION: NO CITY POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
This article queried how the dialogue surrounding greater municipal autonomy intersects with 
Indigenous rights, with a particular focus on Toronto. The first part of the article set out the ways 
in which Toronto sought empowerment following Bill 5. This included a discussion of the 
constitutional role of Canadian municipalities, the advances made by courts and provincial 
governments, and the yet-to-be implemented possibilities of protection through a little-used 
mechanism of the Constitution. The following section analyzed the obligations of municipalities 
in respect of Indigenous Peoples and communities with or without increased authority. I explained 
the ways in which municipal governments are introducing legal reforms to improve Indigenous-
municipal relationships, the increasing expectations of municipal consultation with First Nations, 
and the direction of Canadian jurisprudence. Overall, this reflection drives toward the conclusion 
that municipalities seeking protection or asserting their roles as democratic governments within 
the Canadian federal landscape must understand their obligations to Indigenous Peoples and 
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